Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros, Titular Professor of Comparative International Politics at the UFPE Department of Political Science and PQ-1C Fellow at CNPq. E-mail: marcelo.medeiros@ufpe.br
The famous phrase in the affirmative is pronounced by the general and consul Julius Caesar before the Senate of Rome, referring to his recent victory over Pharnaces II of Pontus at the Battle of Zela (47 BC). The message is seen as a warning to senators: military power wins. And if he tames external enemies, why not slaughter internal ones? Those who foment a civil war that, inside the walls, corrodes the Roman political system?
Two recent episodes deal in different ways – but not without connection – with this idea of providential and energetic power once captured by the centurions: the authoritarian constancy of Vladimir Putin and the democratic fluidity of the government of Liz Trouss.
After a spasm perestroika and for volume started by Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed. On its ruins, the construction of a political structure consonant with the victorious and now agreed-upon market democracy captured by the West during the Cold War, in particular by Washington and Brussels, is being encouraged. However, Moscow’s handling of this binomial – democracy/market – soon proves problematic. If, on the one hand, the break with the omnipresence of the state in the economy is relatively open, which led to Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2012; on the other hand, the reforms necessary to establish a democratic regime are carried out timidly and hesitantly, which indicates how deeply rooted political forces in authoritarianism. The fact is that ever since Boris Yeltsin stepped down from power in 1999, Vladimir Putin has promoted a government based on oligarchic foundations that does not meet Schumpeter’s criteria for minimalist democracy.[1] or even to the idea of Polyarchy put forward by Dahl[2].
The real possibility of a change of power, without a doubt, is the main asset of democracy. Long-lived governments, such as that of President François Mitterrand (age 14) in France or Chancellor Angela Merkel (age 16) in Germany, emerge with little fanfare, as they function entirely within the parameters of effective institutional control that provides a real opportunity for rotation. It may not even happen, but if it does, it is the result of democratic will. By contrast, authoritarian regimes lack this capacity for change. They tend to perpetuate themselves through repressive practices, media control, and indiscriminate use of force. In a word, such regimes hinder freedom of choice and fight any transformational movements. Thus, they rely on a police/military apparatus that can guarantee them the means of coercion necessary for their existence. In addition, they often elect external enemies to help solidify a society’s identity and showcase its strength. In other words, they go to war, as the Argentine Raul Alfonsin does in the Falklands in 1982, or as Putin is doing now with his invasion of Ukraine.
Moscow appears to have been wrong in assuming that this show of force against Kyiv would breathe new life into the regime. what should have been lightning war has been going on for several months with unexpected setbacks. Russia is suffering economically while at the same time strengthening ties between Western countries, in particular through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States and the European Union quickly and without hesitation support the troops of Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin comes, sees, but does not win. Worse, movements of flight and protest are springing up, mostly against mobilization and convocation at the order of the president, helping to undermine the despotic regime, already sick, but resisting fiercely and firmly. This crisis, however, has no democratic way to overcome it. Hypertrophy of the executive power combined with the complete absence of mechanisms checks and balances suggest three possible paths: tightening up the current despotic government, selectively purge and keep the regime under a new command, or even a popular revolutionary movement. In all three cases, violence predominates, with its vile consequences of death.
The second episode mentioned here is deprived of a military tunic. But it does show how democratic mechanisms work to contain unrealistic outbreaks and promote a peaceful rotation. It’s Liz Truss’s lightning-fast crossing of 10 downing street. The shortest term for a prime minister in British history (less than 50 days). Despite her poignant speech, sweetened with messianic taunts, Mrs. Truss, in practice, is unable to make her government’s policies viable. That is, like Putin, he comes, sees, but also does not win. He will not win the economic battle or the Brexit challenge. In the end, his strategy is not convincing. However, unlike her Russian counterpart, she is forced to resign due to unforeseen circumstances in the British parliamentary regime.
It is a fact that democratic regimes have weaknesses. For example, in the French Third Republic (1871–1940), a new cabinet changed on average every six months.[3]. This hectic alternation undoubtedly greatly damaged the administration of Paris during this long period. However, it is the right to the possibility of change that guarantees people the search for the right political path. Therefore, it is simply necessary to treat it responsibly. Subordination imposed by force on the part of the executive, legislature or judiciary is undesirable. Equality of power is the cornerstone of the proper functioning of democracy. The yoke of a centurion, aedile or praetor threatens: I came, I saw, I conquered?
Ratings
[1] SCHUMPETER, Joseph. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1942.
[2] DAL, Robert. Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
[3] SHEARER, William. BUT Fall of France. Collapse of the Third Republic. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1969.
