Defenders of the name Srgio Moro as the presidential race sparked a political movement to try and convince the former justice minister to run for next year’s presidential election. A campaign called “Moro 2022 against the system” is calling for the former judge to take the “third way” lane as an alternative to the candidacies of President Jair Bolsonaro and former President Luis Incio Lula da Silva. The movement has also grown with Moro’s presence in Brazil – today he lives and works in the United States – where he spoke with advocating politicians and other leaders.
For Moro’s supporters, he has yet to determine if he is ready to play candidate on the plateau. But, according to politically close Senator Oriovisto Guimares (Podemos-PR), he also did not rule out the possibility of participating in the dispute. The deadline for this decision is October, and the political scenario is already somewhat more defined.
“We have a great dialogue with Moro,” says Senator Oriovisto. “He already told us that if he decides to go into politics, he will join Podemos. We had several meetings and we insist on it. Moreau didn’t agree to run for president, but he didn’t. ” I also said no. He asks for time to think. Time to get busy campaign to accept it now, ”he says.
mobilization pr-moro he is already discussing organizing events to raise his name, such as business lunches, which are planned to attract support for the movement. Other parties are also contacted about a possible project around Moro’s candidacy to provide political power for a possible presidential campaign.
Alderman do Novo in So Paulo, Fernando Holiday also saw the opportunity for the former minister to join presidential race… “Brazilians hope Moro will be a candidate in 2022. I live focused, I have an impeccable career and I have the courage to confront the corrupt machine that is destroying the country, ”the politician said.
Oriovisto Guimares says the current political structure has created a “political vacuum” where Moro could be a meaningful electoral alternative.
“Brazil is experiencing bipolar politics… absurd thing. Today the choice is between the corruption of the left and the corruption of the right. These are two corruptions of different ideological colors. But they are equally corrupt governments. One of them deals with issues related to the vaccine business, Queiroz. Of Lula You don’t even need to speak. After the monthly payment and oil, there is no more talk about corruption in the PT. Brazil cannot limit itself to these two options, ”says the senator from Parana.
According to him, a growing number of Bolsonaro voters are disappointed with the work of their government and allegations of violations. “We live in a democracy and we want to continue to live in a democracy. So we must understand and accept that it is legal that anyone who wants to elect Lulu is fighting for him. Bolsonaro, fight for it. We cannot be intolerant of anyone. But we also don’t want to be intolerant of us. Because we do not want either one or the other. We need a third way. We want someone to materialize, personify politeness, democracy, culture, ethics, preparation, respect for service. This is not the case in Bolsonaro. “
Despite the enthusiasm of his supporters, Moreau’s candidacy is not easy. After the Supreme Court overturned decisions that convicted former President Lula and considered the former judge partialthere was an undeniable loss of political capital and an erosion of the image. In addition, his stormy passage through the Bolsonaro government also contributed to the weakening of his name as an option for building a third path.
Until a few months ago, Moro regularly participated in conversations with other members of the so-called central group, such as Governors Ju Doria and Eduardo Leite, host Luciano Hac, former minister Luis Enrique Mandetta and Ju Amodo from Novo. Gradually, the group was disunited, and negotiations around a single candidacy were practically over. Since the decision of the Supreme Court is still recent, Moreau preferred to take on a more restrained role. But with Bolsonaro’s rapid political collapse, pressure to run as a candidate resumed.
“He who enters has the task of taking others.” Those were the words spoken by one of the I Vote Black coordinators, Monica Oliveira, during the Northeast Black Women’s Meeting – Smearing Parliament, which took place on the floor of Parliament this Friday. Esuda Faculty of Science, Recife Center. Bringing together 36 of more than 50 candidates assisted by the project in the Northeast, the meeting discussed the importance of black women’s representation, not only as a quantitative factor, but also as a means of implementing policies to combat racism. The event is an initiative of the Black Women’s Network of Pernambuco and Casa da Mulher do Nordeste as part of the Black Women’s Project to Spaces of Power.
In an audience filled with candidacies of black women, social movements and supporters, voices jumbled together, chanting the same thing: denigrate the political scene with anti-racist women candidatures. Even though they make up 28% of the Brazilian population, black women are still underrepresented in these areas of power. In 2020, these women accounted for only 2% of the National Congress, according to the National Household Continuous Sample Survey (Pnad) conducted by IBGE, which is a reality according to which the “Eu Voto em Negra” project, which operates after the 2020 municipal elections, aims to eradicate.
“The idea is to strengthen the candidacy of cis and transgender black women so that we can expand our presence in parliament and in the executive branch,” explains Monica Oliveira. “In our understanding, this stage is especially aimed at strengthening the presence in the legislature as a step towards the executive,” he adds. Media training, communications services, political and technical training are some of the jobs offered by Eu Voto em Negra to women who have been referred to promote these candidacies in an election year “more challenging” than 2020, according to Monika’s assessment.
“We are approaching the fourth year of Bolsonaro’s rule, so there is a resurgence of various forms of violence such as racism, misogyny, LGBT phobia,” he emphasizes. “All this set of violence that affects women, especially the black population.”
In an effort to circumvent this scenario, several black women from nine northeastern states committed to anti-racism have come forward to run for seats in the legislature and executive. As part of a collective mandate, Pretas sang Bahía, candidate for the state of Marcia Minister (Psol), who also ran for councilor in El Salvador’s 2020 municipal elections, says she recognizes the difficulty of entering places that are normally inaccessible to women like she is. , but even though he didn’t win the contest that year, he reiterates the importance of not giving up. “We cannot refuse to fight, we send a signal that we are ready to take these positions,” he said.
In the same stance, Crisiel (PT), Maranhao’s state candidate, classifies the meeting as a “very symbolic moment” and an exchange of experiences in search of reinforcement. “It’s a very happy and very symbolic moment to bring together so many black women’s candidatures at a time of so many failures in the country, we’ve come to reaffirm our fight,” she says.
Pernambuco federal candidate Robyonce Lima (Psol), who is part of the first collective mandate (Juntas Codexepoutadas) elected to the Legislative Assembly of Pernambuco (Alepe) in the 2018 elections, says there is a need to expand on achievements and regulate national politics in view of the onset of conservatism in country. “We need more and more women in politics to vilify these spaces, to tie our plans to gender and race,” she comments. “We need to change this story, we will have a transvestite, a black bench in the Federal Chamber after 200 years of Brazilian independence. This is a historical reparation.”
letter of commitment
During the meeting, the political project announced by the women present was presented with a signed letter titled “Black Women of the Northeast Smearing Parliament” consisting of 13 commitments read by Monica Oliveira. While citing small gains in representativeness in institutional policy, the paper highlights points that need to be considered and worked on.
Photo: Tylynn Barrett / DP Photo
“We want a democracy that goes beyond voting every two years. We want democracy, which means not only the right to speak, but also the right to be heard and jointly shape the direction of the country,” the excerpt from the letter explains.
Commitments that recognize black heritage, place political spaces at the service of the fight against racism, strengthen alliances with anti-racist organizations, and build on the principle of collectivism were some of the agendas presented.
Since the Legislative Assembly had a larger base of parliamentarians, there have been periods in the last few decades when the governors of the states have exercised great influence over the Parliament of Minas Gerais. The contractor’s projects were approved almost always without any restrictions. Because of this connection between the two powers, civil servants and even deputies used to wittily refer to the Assembly as a simple “department of the executive.”
Something unprecedented happened in the current legislature: unlike what had happened in previous governments, the president of the Minas Gerais State Assembly was not connected to the governor. And a good part of the parties, once allies of the governors, do not support the current government. Among them are PP, PTB, Tsidadaniya (former PPP) and MDB.
This happened to some extent due to the position of the new governor. Elected with a speech that largely echoed here in the state the same platform that Jair Bolsonaro took during the 2018 election campaign, Romeu Zema declared during the campaign that there would no longer be political “conchavos” in his government. .
At that time, segments of the right, characterized by anti-political discourse, viewed as “conchavos” alliances or agreements made between politicians and parties. These methods are supposed to be forms of corruption. Following this logic, the then candidate Zema introduced himself as a successful business administrator and promised to objectively and technically manage the state. Then there would be no need for negotiations, which were considered a typical practice of the “old policy”.
A government was installed that was not flexible and showed little readiness for dialogue. However, in the first few months of his reign, Zema’s rule was already under threat. There were only three deputies in his Novo party at that time. It would be very difficult to govern with such a disproportion of power, with only three allies in the universe of the 77 deputies that make up the Legislative Assembly. Supporters were deputies from the same party as the governor: Barto (today in the PL), Guilherme da Cunha and Laura Serrano.
While Zema was reluctant to join the parliamentarians, four blocs were formed in the Assembly for the first time. Prior to that, the formation of a maximum of three blocs was common: the opposition, the “neutrals” (as they called themselves) and the pro-government ones. As of 2019, by contrast, two “neutral” blocs (instead of one) have been formed in addition to the opposition and government blocs.
Each of the “neutrals” was led by MDB and PSD. In total, both political groups started the legislature with 40 of the 77 seats in parliament. Therefore, any governmental movement depended, first of all, on articulation with two groups of deputies. In cases where the opposition, due to a coincidence of interests, joined these groups claiming independence, the government had no chance of approving their projects.
To have a minimum of controllability, Zema mainly turned to PSDB. Thanks to its rich experience and political skill, this party managed to attract other abbreviations to the ruling base. Thus, in the first half of 2019, 21 parliamentarians were on the side of the governor. The PT-led opposition had 16 members. Thus, it was a minority bloc.
During 2019, the alliance with the PSDB became closer. For most of Zema’s term, this party was important to the government. It is worth recalling that Zema won the election in the second round against the PSDB candidate (former Governor Antonio Anastasia, now in TCU). Thus, it was not a very common case that a party that was defeated in an election then assumed a central role in the conduct of an elected government.
In the first half of 2019, Custódio Mattos (PSDB) took over the management of the Secretariat of the Government, the body responsible for the dialogue between the Assembly and the executive branch. Luisa Barreto (PSDB) also became Deputy Minister of Planning. Today she leads the portfolio.
Even though he managed to make a base, Zema still tried to maintain his position of not practicing “konchavos”. This means, at least apparently, that efforts to create a parliamentary base will not be made, since many other agreements were concluded in the process of forming the government. Without commitment or identification with the executive branch, parliamentarians inflicted severe defeats on the governor, whose projects to correct the state machine were generally unpopular and in many cases meant the demise of politics or public services. The single most effective government project approved in 2019 was the administrative reform, which reorganized the structure of government.
This situation of political weakness on the part of the executive branch is not common in recent history, except in very specific cases. The Assembly began to set the tone for politics in Minas. In addition to approving the mining project, the Parliament also held discussions on the public debt of Minas and the loss of revenue resulting from the Kandir law. He also increased his power over public accounts by including in the state constitution the government’s obligation to amend the budget for parliamentarians and blocs.
In addition, the Assembly attempted to further increase government oversight when it introduced secretaries of state accountability every four months in 2019.
Also in 2019, a draft was sent to the parliament, which the government considers the most important for the state. We are talking about joining the Tax Collection Regime (RRF) established by Supplementary Law No. 159 of 2017. It is assumed that the purpose of the RRF is to provide financial assistance to the state. In short, this is a temporary suspension of Minas’ debt collection to the federal government. On the other hand, the state must take a number of unpopular measures, including the sale of companies such as Cemig and Copasa, as well as a long-term ban on wage increases.
Joining the RFF has been put on hold until today in the Assembly and is facing significant voting difficulties even in this legislature.
In 2020, due to the pandemic, the government abandoned the protection of the SBR. Efforts have been focused on other fronts, especially health. In connection with the moment of the natural disaster, many government directives were approved. However, those not directly related to the pandemic, such as destination and resource checks stemming from the agreement with Vale, have been blocked or changed.
With the beginning of the slowdown of the pandemic, at the end of 2021, the government resumed the defense of the RRF. However, his weak political articulation prevented him from moving forward. Then the governor requested urgently in working out the tax regime. This regimental instrument prevents other projects from being considered in plenary until the urgent matter is assessed. However, the Assembly ignored the request and did not decide to place this project on an emergency basis.
In this regard, the Governor sued the Legislative Assembly, claiming that the Parliament violated the Minas Gerais State Constitution by failing to comply with its demands. The President of the Legislative Assembly, Agostinho Patrus (PSD), then responded to a request and explained the urgency of joining the RRF. In view of this, the governor withdrew from the trial.
Another confusion was caused by the executive branch, announcing a 37% increase in the salaries of security personnel in 2019. Zema was criticized even outside the state for this decision, which was considered reckless. There was a conflict that only recently found a solution, in 2022. After tense negotiations, the government achieved a 10.06% readjustment.
The State Parliament realized that this setting could not apply only to security servers. The Governor then again turned to justice to try to withhold the additional pay raise granted by the Assembly. In addition to the expansion of the groups that will receive the increase, the percentages proposed by the Assembly have reached 40%. This conflict ended only when the Federal Supreme Court granted Zema’s request and prevented the application of higher rates set by MPs.
During this period of litigation, the chief executive lost more support in parliament. Zema’s base has been reduced from 21 in 2019 to 16 this year. And to top it all off, it disbanded in April 2021. This is because with the departure of MP Neliando Pimenta (PSB), it was reduced to 15 parliamentarians. For it to exist as a bloc, an Assembly Regiment requires that it be composed of at least 16 members.
However, in early July, the ruling bench was reorganized. This is because União Brasil decided to join Zema. Thus, today there are 16 parliamentarians again on the side of the governor.
Now the “neutral” blocs have recently merged into a single bloc of 36 parliamentarians. It is still the largest political group in the Assembly. Since the beginning of the work of the legislative body, the opposition has received 7 deputies. Today it has 23 parliamentarians. At least since the redemocratization of the country, the opposition has never had such a large number of members. And for the first time, pro-government members are in the minority in the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais.
In the Contextus Bulletin, Nesp’s Public Powers Monitoring Advisory Board deepens its analysis of the Assembly’s situation in this legislature. The approach focuses on projects approved by MPs, as well as the transfer of resources promoted by them.
A portrait of Brazil going to the polls in October: Forty out of every 100 voters depend on government assistance to survive.
On the demographic map, this corresponds to 40% of the population. In the voting booth, he represents 55% of the voters.
In total, CadÚnico, the federal database of low-income families, has 86 million people registered in two dozen social programs ranging from Help for Brazil exemption from fees for participation in public auctions.
This is a measure of national poverty. It contains an intriguing political mystery: Brazil has become a mass democracy, with regular elections, universal and direct suffrage, but the vast majority of voters still need public financial assistance to live on.
Viewed from a different angle, this August 1822 colonial village of 4.6 million, fed by slave labor, is now a two-century-old nation that depends on government cash transfers to the poor to keep its economy going.
This happens in thirteen of the 27 states where there are more people surviving through social programs than paid workers in the formal market. Examples: in Maranhao, the number of beneficiaries exceeds by 550,000 the total number of employees with a formal contract; in Bahia, 410,000; in Para, 330,000; in Pernambuco, 150,000; and in Ceara, 110,000.
In some states, more than half of the population can support themselves only through public assistance. This applies to Roraima (66%), Amapa (63%), Akko (60%) and Para (60%).
The more unreliable the labor market, the greater the dependence on social programs. And this money mobilizes the economy – each real of aid paid out moves 1.4 reals, Fundação Getulio Vargas calculates.
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The effects in the elections are obvious to government officials in the race for re-election. Jair Bolsonaro there is reason to smile with the start of the Auxílio Brasil payout (from R$400 to R$600) just seven weeks before the first round. He should thank the opposition for approving the injection of 40 billion reais into social programs in connection with the emergence of double-digit inflation.
“Brazil supports democracy, where the majority depends on state aid”
The blow was felt by Bolsonaro’s main opponent in the polls. It is not easy to compete with those in control of the state structure and budget, and they beat around the bush “making the largest distribution of money the political campaign has seen since the decline of the Empire.” Lula he may have exaggerated the bill, but he knows the point of the maneuver – the Bolsa Família played a crucial role in his re-election in 2006, helping to clear the scene of the monthly benefit crisis.
This type of direct income transfer cushions the effects of collective impoverishment in the short term, but it is ephemeral because it depends on government cash flows. Increased aid to Brazil expires in December. It will be very difficult for the next government to return (up to 400 reais per month). Lula explored this hypothesis with businessmen this week, exuding causticity: “One has to wonder if people will peacefully accept the waiver of election benefits.” Everything is possible. Bolsonaro is acting on the verge of risk, but has not yet indicated a preferred option for political suicide.
Relief programs are, in fact, a minimal share of the federal budget, in which about 40% of the money is always reserved for “rolling over” the national debt, the Republican Pandora’s box. In practice, temporary social initiatives served as a front to hide the responsibility of governments to reduce secular national poverty.
In the 19th century, inequality was seen as natural, and helping the poor was seen as charity, a kind of perception that still lingers in the modernist salons of Brasília. There is progress, but clearly not enough.
Signs of social regression are now shining through the official records for most of the electorate in a country trapped in the low economic growth of the past four decades. Underdevelopment cannot be improvised, it is the work of the ages, said Nelson Rodriguez. Because even the outline of the country project is not visible, the horizon remains blurred. Paradoxically, in the redesign of globalization, alternatives are seen as a way out of the crisis – one of them is economic reconstruction based on an abundance of renewable resources. The election campaign represents a new chance to save the future. It depends only on courage and competence, political benefits, which have long been lacking.
Reviewers’ texts do not necessarily reflect the views of VEJA.